On 22 September 2026, EU governments did two things at once.
They extended the main list of people and entities sanctioned for undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity. The rollover is 36 months, to 22 September 2029. Reporting puts the remaining list at about 3,000 names. Until now, that list had been renewed every six months.
They also decided not to renew the listings of Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman. The asset freeze and travel ban attached to those names fall away at EU level.
Both facts are true. Using only the second one to say "the EU went soft on Russia" leaves out the decision that kept thousands of other listings in force for three years.
Status note: Checked 24 September 2026. The 36-month extension and the Usmanov/Fridman delistings are reported from the 22 September Council decision. Latvia and Estonia have said they will look at national measures. Those national files were not complete at publication. Other EU Russia sanctions, on energy, finance and technology, run on separate legal clocks.
What the Council decided
The list in question is the individual and entity regime for actions that undermine or threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. It is the travel-ban and asset-freeze list, not the whole sanctions architecture.
Agence Europe reported that member states agreed on 22 September to remove Usmanov and Fridman from that list and to extend the regime by 36 months, to 22 September 2029. Reuters reported the same trade: drop the two billionaires, roll the remaining roughly 3,000 listings for three years.
The Council also, in the same review, did not renew three individuals and one entity, and removed three people who had died. TASS quoted the institution on those quieter deletions. Those are housekeeping, not the political fight.
The Irish presidency, according to Agence Europe, called the result a difficult compromise. That is the right word. Sanctions of this kind need unanimity. One capital can hold the entire rollover hostage.
Why two names became the price of a three-year list
Reuters reported that France pressed to take Usmanov off the list, with a national-security framing, and that Luxembourg was the capital most associated with the Fridman case and the litigation around it. Those are reported diplomatic positions, not courtroom findings in this article.
Latvia held out. Agence Europe said it publicly opposed the compromise during a written procedure, then moved to a constructive abstention so the decision could pass. Latvia also said it would take national measures against the two men.
That sequence explains the shape of the deal. Capitals that wanted the two names off the list could not get there without a yes, or at least an abstention, from everyone else. Capitals that wanted to keep the two names on the list could not block the delisting without also risking the wider rollover. The three-year extension was the payoff. A longer clock means fewer of these hostage fights in the next six-month cycle.
Ukraine called the delisting shameful. Baltic governments criticised the signal. Those reactions are part of the record. They do not rewrite the legal text. The EU list is shorter by two prominent names. It is also longer in time.
Delisting is not an acquittal
Coming off an EU travel ban and asset freeze means those EU measures stop. It does not mean a court found the original listing unlawful in every capital. It does not mean UK, US or other national sanctions disappear. It does not mean banks will rush to reopen every account.
Compliance teams will treat the EU change as one jurisdiction. They will still have to read UK and US lists, and any new Latvian or Estonian national measures. A name can be off the EU list and still be frozen somewhere else.
That is why "freed" is a sloppy word. Usmanov and Fridman are off this EU list. They are not, by that fact alone, clear of every restriction that matters to a bank in Frankfurt, Paris or Riga.
The rest of the machine is still running
The individual list is only one track. Energy import bans, financial restrictions, export controls on battlefield goods and measures against the Russian military-industrial base sit in other instruments. Agence Europe noted that the EU was still preparing a large additional package against firms tied to that industrial base, aimed at a later Council meeting.
If those other instruments stay in force, the 22 September decision is a political scar on the individual list, not a dismantling of the Russia sanctions system.
If a reader only sees the two surnames, the story sounds like collapse. If a reader only sees "extended to 2029," the story sounds like hardening. The accurate version is the trade: a longer rollover, two high-profile deletions, and a reminder that unanimity can be used both to keep sanctions and to punch holes in them.
What to watch next
National follow-up is the first test. Latvia said it would act at home. Estonia has been reported as looking at the same. If those measures land, the practical effect of the EU delisting shrinks inside the Baltic states even as the EU-wide freeze lifts.
Litigation is the second test. Fridman's case has been part of the Luxembourg story in the reporting. Future judgments could force more names off, or they could fail and leave the list as it now stands.
The third test is the next listing package. A three-year clock on the existing names does not stop the EU from adding new ones. It only changes how often the old ones come up for a veto fight.
How to say this cleanly
The EU did not end Russia sanctions. It renewed the main individual list for three years and, to get that done, took Usmanov and Fridman off it. France and Luxembourg are reported as the capitals that pushed the carve-out. Latvia delayed the deal, then stood aside, and talked about national replacements. Ukraine and other eastern members called the signal ugly.
That is a story about how the EU makes sanctions, not a story about Brussels giving up on Russia.
Sources: Reuters, 22 September 2026; Agence Europe, 22 September 2026; Council statements as quoted in those reports and in subsequent EU-timeline coverage.